{"id":6014,"date":"2026-11-05T17:30:37","date_gmt":"2026-11-05T16:30:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/solar-project-financing-models\/"},"modified":"2026-11-05T17:30:37","modified_gmt":"2026-11-05T16:30:37","slug":"solar-project-financing-models","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/de\/solar-project-financing-models\/","title":{"rendered":"Solar Project Financing Models: Five Structures Compared Side by Side"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1>Solar Project Financing Models: Five Structures Compared Side by Side<\/h1>\n<p>Solar Project Financing Models differ in one thing above all: which entity owns the plant and which entity&#8217;s cash flow repays the debt. Everything else \u2014 leverage, tenor, covenants, reporting \u2014 follows from that. This article compares five structures used to finance a solar project: project finance, balance-sheet debt, third-party ownership, US tax equity, and pooled community capital. Each is described by its mechanism and its trade-offs, with the ranges that lenders and sponsors actually work within, so you can decide which one fits before you approach anyone.<\/p>\n<h2>Project Finance vs Balance-Sheet Finance: Which Structure Owns the Asset<\/h2>\n<p>In project finance, a special purpose vehicle (SPV) holds the plant, the power purchase agreement and the debt. Lenders look only to the SPV&#8217;s cash flow, with limited recourse to the sponsor. In balance-sheet finance, the sponsor borrows against its own credit and the plant sits on its books. That split is the hinge on which the rest of this comparison turns.<\/p>\n<p>The sequence for a project-financed solar project is fixed and unforgiving:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>SPV incorporated in the project&#8217;s jurisdiction<\/li>\n<li>Land secured by purchase or long lease, then transferred or leased to the SPV<\/li>\n<li>Power purchase agreement executed with the offtaker<\/li>\n<li>Lender due diligence on the PPA counterparty, the resource assessment and the EPC contract<\/li>\n<li>Financial close, with all conditions precedent satisfied<\/li>\n<li>Drawdown in tranches tied to construction milestones<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Debt sizing typically caps at 70\u201380% of project cost in this market, with debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) covenants commonly set at 1.20x\u20131.30x on the base case. DSCR measures how many times over the project&#8217;s cash flow covers the year&#8217;s principal and interest: a 1.25x covenant means the model must show \u20ac1.25 of cash available for every \u20ac1.00 of debt service. Lender terms vary by jurisdiction, counterparty and vintage, so treat those as ranges to test, not a term sheet.<\/p>\n<p>What each structure demands from the sponsor is different in kind:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Project finance<\/strong> needs a bankable PPA, a completed independent resource assessment, and a security package \u2014 share pledge, account pledge, assignment of PPA rights.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Balance-sheet finance<\/strong> needs a healthy corporate balance sheet and tolerates a merchant or partially contracted project that a project lender would decline.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Recourse is the practical dividing line. If the sponsor cannot walk away from the plant without the lender pursuing its other assets, it is not project finance, regardless of how the loan is labelled. A useful test at term-sheet stage: ask the lender to name, in writing, every asset it can pursue if the SPV defaults. If the list runs past the SPV&#8217;s shares, accounts and contracts, you are looking at corporate recourse with project-finance language.<\/p>\n<p>Why the entity matters before any debt is raised: Solar Plus Garden&#8217;s own structure pairs an Estonian O\u00dc with a Serbian DOO that holds and operates the plant, while the Garden entity is legally separate with exclusive rights to the Garden concept. That separation is exactly the question a lender asks first \u2014 which legal person owns the asset, which receives the revenue, and which carries the obligations \u2014 and it is cheaper to answer before incorporation of the borrowing entity than after.<\/p>\n<h2>Power Purchase Agreements: Contract Length Decides the Financing<\/h2>\n<p>The power purchase agreement is the revenue contract lenders underwrite. Without a contracted offtaker, most senior debt in project finance is either unavailable or priced sharply higher, because the lender has no counterparty to look to when the market price falls.<\/p>\n<p>Contract length drives loan tenor. A 10\u201315 year PPA supports a loan amortised across that contracted period. A 5-year corporate PPA forces either a shorter amortisation schedule or a merchant tail that the lender discounts heavily when sizing debt. The purchase agreement is therefore not a commercial document that financing follows \u2014 it is the document that sets the financing&#8217;s shape.<\/p>\n<p>Price structure changes the revenue line the model must defend:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Fixed-price PPA:<\/strong> predictable revenue, easiest to finance, but the sponsor gives up upside if market prices rise.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Index-linked PPA:<\/strong> revenue tracks an inflation or market index; lenders model the index path and stress it.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Discount-to-market PPA:<\/strong> a fixed percentage below a reference price; revenue moves with the market, so lenders apply merchant-style sensitivities to the discounted portion.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Counterparty credit is the second underwriting question. An investment-grade utility offtaker and a single-site commercial offtaker get very different pricing and covenants even on identical plant output, because the lender is underwriting the offtaker&#8217;s ability to pay for 10\u201315 years, not the panels. Many lenders publish internal minimum credit thresholds; ask a prospective lender what rating band it requires before you spend money on legal drafting.<\/p>\n<p>The clauses a lender&#8217;s counsel reads first are the negotiation checklist: curtailment (who bears the cost when the grid operator restricts output), change-in-law (who absorbs new taxes or regulatory costs), and termination payments (what the offtaker owes if it walks away). A PPA that is silent or vague on these three is not bankable in most markets.<\/p>\n<p>Two negotiation points worth costing early. Curtailment: if the offtaker can curtail without compensation, the model must carry a curtailment assumption in every operating year, and the lender will set the DSCR on the curtailed case. Change-in-law: the clause should name the taxes and charges it covers; &#8220;all future regulation&#8221; is unenforceable in most jurisdictions and worthless as protection.<\/p>\n<p>Physical versus virtual (financial) PPA matters for security. A virtual PPA settles against a market reference price and does not deliver electrons. Whether it can serve as security for a project-finance lender depends on the market&#8217;s contract and insolvency law; this is jurisdiction-dependent and subject to change, so confirm with local counsel.<\/p>\n<p>One distinction worth keeping clean: on solarplusgarden.com, the Phase 2 guaranteed-payout pathway is a contractual return promise to investors, not a PPA. It is a different instrument with a different risk profile, and this article does not imply it is a PPA structure.<\/p>\n<h2>Third-Party Ownership and Solar Leases: The Commercial Rooftop Route<\/h2>\n<p>Third-party ownership means a financier owns the array and the host buys the output under a PPA or pays rent under a lease. The host avoids capital outlay, but does not own the asset and cannot claim the depreciation.<\/p>\n<p>Solar lease versus PPA on the same commercial roof is a question of who bears production risk:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Lease:<\/strong> payments are typically a fixed monthly amount per kW installed. A poor production year is the host&#8217;s problem \u2014 the host pays regardless of output.<\/li>\n<li><strong>PPA:<\/strong> payments track kWh produced. A poor production year is the owner&#8217;s problem \u2014 the host pays only for what arrives.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The direction of risk transfer is the deciding commercial fact, not the headline rate.<\/p>\n<p>The tax picture is why this market exists in the US. The owner of the system claims the federal Investment Tax Credit and depreciation, which a tax-exempt host \u2014 a school, municipality or nonprofit \u2014 cannot use. That gap is precisely where tax equity enters; the next section covers it.<\/p>\n<p>Lease terms to check before signing:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Escalator, commonly 1\u20132% per year<\/li>\n<li>Term, often 15\u201325 years<\/li>\n<li>Buyout schedule and the price at each year<\/li>\n<li>Removal and re-roofing obligations \u2014 who pays when the roof needs replacement mid-term<\/li>\n<li>What happens on sale of the property: does the new owner assume the lease, and on what terms<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Run the escalator against your electricity price before signing. A 1% annual escalator on a 20-year lease raises the year-20 payment roughly 22% above year one; a 2% escalator raises it roughly 49%. If grid tariffs rise more slowly, the host ends up paying above market in the back half of the term \u2014 and the buyout in that year is the only exit.<\/p>\n<p>The structure does not travel well. Markets without an equivalent tax credit or net-metering framework give third-party ownership a much thinner value proposition, so the US-centric economics here are jurisdiction-bound and subject to change.<\/p>\n<p>Name the difference to avoid conflation: Solar Plus Garden&#8217;s membership model is not a rooftop lease. It is a one-time \u20ac200 membership fee plus an optional \u20ac20\/month garden box, disclosed on the site, and it buys community access rather than a leasehold in a rooftop array.<\/p>\n<h2>Tax Equity: How the US Investment Tax Credit Gets Monetised<\/h2>\n<p>Tax equity solves a specific problem: the ITC and accelerated depreciation are only valuable to an entity with sufficient tax liability. A developer with no tax appetite sells those attributes to a bank or insurer that has one, in exchange for a share of the project&#8217;s cash flow.<\/p>\n<p>Two structures dominate:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Partnership flip:<\/strong> a tax equity partner invests in the project&#8217;s owning partnership, takes the bulk of tax attributes and cash until a flip point, after which allocations reverse toward the sponsor.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Sale-leaseback:<\/strong> the tax equity investor buys the asset and leases it back to the developer, claiming the tax attributes as owner.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The sequenced mechanics of a partnership flip: tax equity contributes at mechanical completion or placed-in-service, receives 99% of tax allocations and a preferred return, then allocations flip to the sponsor once the target yield or flip date is met. The sponsor&#8217;s share of cash typically rises at the flip, which is why the flip point is negotiated as hard as the headline contribution.<\/p>\n<p>Scale reference: tax equity has historically supplied a meaningful minority share of US utility-scale project capital alongside senior debt and sponsor equity. Think of it as a three-source stack rather than one universal percentage, because the split shifts with tax law and deal specifics.<\/p>\n<p>This section exists to draw a boundary. Tax equity is the clearest case of a financing model that is institution-specific and does not transfer to the EU or Serbian market. A reader financing outside the US should use project finance, balance-sheet debt or pooled community capital instead. ITC rules, adders and transferability provisions change with each US legislative cycle, and nothing here is current tax advice.<\/p>\n<h2>Community and Crowd Financing: Many Small Investors, One Plant<\/h2>\n<p>This model answers a structural question: how a 10 MW plant raises capital when the sponsor cannot access a single large lender, or does not want to \u2014 by pooling many small commitments.<\/p>\n<p>Two legal shapes matter, and the choice determines how many people you can approach:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Regulated crowdfunding or a public-offer exemption<\/strong>, with a cap per investor. Broader reach, heavier disclosure and marketing rules.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Unregulated private placement<\/strong> limited to qualified or professional investors. Narrower reach, lighter disclosure, but you cannot market to the public.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In the EU, the choice sits against a named regime: the European Crowdfunding Service Provider Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2020\/1503, &#8220;ECSPR&#8221;) licenses platforms to offer securities or loans up to \u20ac5 million per project over twelve months. Above that threshold, or outside a licensed platform, you fall back on national prospectus and private-placement rules \u2014 which differ by member state and are subject to change, so verify the current threshold for your jurisdiction.<\/p>\n<p>Escrow and payment mechanics are where community models fail or succeed. Commitments should sit in a segregated account until a defined threshold and financial close \u2014 not land in the operator&#8217;s operating account. That principle maps directly to Solar Plus Garden&#8217;s stated red line against fake or escrow-like arrangements: the money moves only when the condition is met, and everyone can verify it.<\/p>\n<p>Keep the two amounts on the site distinct. The \u20ac500 minimum investment on the Home page is an investment pathway. The \u20ac200 one-time Garden membership fee buys community access and is invested in solar; it is not an equity subscription. A garden box at \u20ac20\/month for 18 produce deliveries a year is a separate optional purchase.<\/p>\n<p>A worked scale check on administration: at the \u20ac500 minimum, a 10 MW plant raising half its capital from small subscriptions would need thousands of individual holdings, each requiring onboarding, KYC and a distribution payment at least once a year. Model the cost per holder per year before you model the return \u2014 that line, not the headline coupon, is what decides whether the community route closes.<\/p>\n<p>Investor-communication obligations scale with investor count. A crowd of 500 small holders needs more frequent, more standardised reporting than two institutional lenders, and the cost of that reporting belongs in the model as an explicit line \u2014 not discovered after close.<\/p>\n<p>Where this model&#8217;s cost of capital lands relative to senior bank debt depends on the mechanism, not a quoted spread: no single underwriter to negotiate with, higher investor-acquisition cost, smaller ticket sizes, and more administration per euro raised. Describe it that way in your own model and let your numbers decide.<\/p>\n<h2>Worked Illustration: A 10 MW Plant Under Three Financing Structures<\/h2>\n<p>This is an illustration, not a market statistic. The assumptions are stated so you can replace them with your own quotes.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Assumptions:<\/strong> 10 MW installed capacity; installed capex of \u20acX per kW (replace X with your EPC quote); specific yield of Y kWh per kWp per year (replace with your site&#8217;s independent yield report); a 15-year PPA at a fixed price per kWh; opex per kW per year from your O&amp;M quote. All three cases share these inputs. Only the financing differs.<\/p>\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>Item<\/th>\n<th>Case A: Project finance<\/th>\n<th>Case B: Balance-sheet loan<\/th>\n<th>Case C: Community pooling<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>Capital sources<\/td>\n<td>Senior debt 70\u201380% of cost; sponsor equity 20\u201330% plus overrun reserve<\/td>\n<td>Corporate loan sized on sponsor credit; sponsor equity as the balance<\/td>\n<td>Many small subscriptions from \u20ac500; membership fees invested in solar<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Who holds the asset<\/td>\n<td>The SPV<\/td>\n<td>The sponsor<\/td>\n<td>The project entity, with many small holders behind it<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Recourse<\/td>\n<td>Limited \u2014 to the SPV and the security package<\/td>\n<td>Full \u2014 to the sponsor&#8217;s other assets<\/td>\n<td>Limited to the project; no single lender underwrites<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Tenor<\/td>\n<td>Matched to the 10\u201315 year PPA<\/td>\n<td>Shorter or on corporate terms; less forgiving schedule<\/td>\n<td>Set by the offering terms, not a single lender<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Who bears production risk<\/td>\n<td>Lenders and sponsor per the DSCR covenant<\/td>\n<td>The sponsor, fully<\/td>\n<td>Investors, per the offering documents<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Extra opex line<\/td>\n<td>Lender reporting and security maintenance<\/td>\n<td>None specific to the project<\/td>\n<td>Investor acquisition and standardised reporting<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>For Case A, sketch the amortisation year by year against the PPA tenor and compute DSCR for each year. In the early years DSCR is typically highest, then narrows as the debt amortises \u2014 the covenant is tested across the whole schedule, not at year one. In Case B the same plant amortises on the sponsor&#8217;s corporate schedule, and the model must show that the sponsor can service the loan even if the plant underperforms. In Case C the subscription schedule and the reporting line replace the covenant as the binding constraint. Replacing X, Y or the tariff will change every figure \u2014 the point is the structure of the comparison, not the output.<\/p>\n<p>Two decision tests fall out of the table. First, if the sponsor&#8217;s other assets cannot absorb a two-year revenue miss, Case B is not available regardless of the rate offered. Second, if the plan is to refinance within five years, only Case A and Case B produce a project that a new lender will underwrite on its own cash flow \u2014 Case C&#8217;s holder base is part of the deal.<\/p>\n<h2>Capex, Opex and Degradation: What Actually Drives the Model<\/h2>\n<p>A lender will stress five inputs first: installed capex per kW, specific yield in kWh per kWp per year from site irradiance, opex per kW per year, annual module degradation, and the tariff or PPA price path. Every financing structure above is only as good as those five numbers.<\/p>\n<p>The degradation figure the model must carry: module warranties commonly guarantee no more than roughly 0.4\u20130.7% annual degradation after an initial first-year loss. A lender&#8217;s base case that omits it will fail its own sensitivity test, and a sponsor who omitted it will be asked to re-run the model.<\/p>\n<p>Separate the opex components rather than lumping them:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>O&amp;M contract<\/li>\n<li>Inverter replacement reserve \u2014 inverters typically need replacement or major refurbishment within the asset life, and the solar technology roadmap does not remove that cost<\/li>\n<li>Insurance<\/li>\n<li>Land lease<\/li>\n<li>Asset management<\/li>\n<li>Grid charges<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The maintenance reserve account is a financing term, not a spreadsheet line. Lenders often require it to be funded from cash flow before any distributions to equity, so it affects both the covenant test and the investor&#8217;s cash timing.<\/p>\n<p>Yield and measurement conventions belong in the same conversation. The independent engineer will report P50 and P90 production \u2014 the P90 case is the one the lender sizes debt on, because it is the production level the site is expected to exceed in nine years out of ten. Ask for both and model the covenant against P90, not P50.<\/p>\n<p>Sensitivity set to run and report: \u00b110% capex, \u00b110% production, and a delay of one year in construction. Each tells you whether the deal survives a realistic miss, and each should be reported to whoever is being asked to commit capital.<\/p>\n<p>Co-locating agriculture on the same land \u2014 the agrivoltaics direction Solar Plus Garden is developing \u2014 changes the land cost and the O&amp;M obligation, and both feed straight into the opex line above. A garden component is an operating cost and a revenue stream, not a decoration on the model.<\/p>\n<h2>Pre-Financial-Close Checklist: Six Things Lenders Ask For<\/h2>\n<p>This is a sequence, not a list of virtues. Each item is a precondition for the next.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><strong>SPV incorporated and asset or land rights secured.<\/strong> The borrower must own the plant and its rights before a lender can take security over them.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Resource assessment and an independent energy yield report.<\/strong> Not the developer&#8217;s own spreadsheet \u2014 an independent engineer&#8217;s P50\/P90 case.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Executed PPA or offtake with a creditworthy counterparty<\/strong>, with the curtailment, change-in-law and termination clauses negotiated.<\/li>\n<li><strong>EPC contract with performance guarantees and a liquidated-damages clause.<\/strong> This is the lender&#8217;s protection against the plant underperforming the model the loan was sized on: if the plant produces less than guaranteed, the EPC contractor pays. Lenders commonly require the guarantee to be backed by a performance bond or parent-company guarantee from the contractor.<\/li>\n<li><strong>O&amp;M contract, insurance and grid connection agreement.<\/strong><\/li>\n<li><strong>Financial model audited against the security package.<\/strong> The model, the contracts and the security must tell the same story.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The security package in one sequence: share pledge over the SPV, pledge over project accounts including the reserve accounts, assignment of PPA and EPC rights, and mortgage or leasehold security over the land.<\/p>\n<p>The item easiest to skip is the legal opinion on enforceability of the PPA and the security in the project&#8217;s jurisdiction. In a two-country structure \u2014 an Estonian O\u00dc alongside a Serbian DOO holding the plant \u2014 that means two sets of advice.<\/p>\n<p>Timeline expectation: due diligence to financial close commonly runs several months once a bankable PPA and an independent yield report exist. It stalls entirely if either is missing, and that stall is the costliest item in the process.<\/p>\n<p>Decision rule: if any of the six items is missing, fix that item before approaching a lender. Shopping an incomplete deal burns lender relationships you will need on the next project.<\/p>\n<h2>H\u00e4ufig gestellte Fragen<\/h2>\n<h3>Do I need a PPA to get project finance for a solar plant?<\/h3>\n<p>For conventional senior debt in project finance, an executed offtake contract with a creditworthy counterparty is what the lender underwrites, and a 10\u201315 year PPA is the usual way to match loan tenor to contracted revenue. Without one, a lender either declines or prices and sizes the loan for a merchant or partially contracted project, generally at lower leverage. Some markets have merchant-finance products, but they carry tighter covenants and higher pricing; check what is actually available in your jurisdiction.<\/p>\n<h3>How much equity do I need to contribute to a 10 MW solar project?<\/h3>\n<p>Under project finance, senior debt typically covers 70\u201380% of project cost, so sponsor equity is the remaining 20\u201330% plus any cost overrun reserve. Under balance-sheet finance the split depends on your own credit rather than the project. Those are market ranges, not a quote: your lender sets the actual number after reviewing the PPA counterparty, the independent yield report and the EPC contract, and the figure moves if any of those is weaker than expected.<\/p>\n<h3>Is tax equity available for solar projects outside the United States?<\/h3>\n<p>Tax equity exists to monetise the US federal Investment Tax Credit and accelerated depreciation, so it is specific to the US tax code. It does not transfer to EU or Serbian projects, which have their own support schemes. If you are financing outside the US, the relevant choices are project finance with a bank, balance-sheet debt, or pooled community capital. US ITC rules and transferability provisions change with legislative cycles and are subject to change.<\/p>\n<h3>How is a community membership fee different from buying an equity stake?<\/h3>\n<p>On solarplusgarden.com, the Garden membership is a one-time \u20ac200 fee that grants community access and is invested in solar, and the optional garden box is \u20ac20 per month for 18 fresh produce deliveries a year. The investment pathway is separate: minimum investments start from \u20ac500, with a long-term equity share option across Phase 1 and Phase 2. A membership fee is not an equity subscription and does not carry an ownership claim in the plant; read the terms and conditions and the current FAQ before committing either amount.<\/p>\n<h2>Pick the Structure Before You Pick the Lender<\/h2>\n<p>If you have, or can sign, a 10\u201315 year PPA with a creditworthy offtaker, project finance at the 70\u201380% leverage band is the default, and your next step is the six-item pre-financial-close checklist, starting with the independent yield report and the EPC performance guarantee.<\/p>\n<p>If you have no PPA but a strong corporate balance sheet, balance-sheet debt keeps the deal moving, but puts your other assets behind it \u2014 the trade is speed and flexibility against recourse.<\/p>\n<p>If neither applies, or you want the community model specifically, pooled capital with escrow-until-threshold is the route. Its cost is a heavier reporting obligation and a longer investor-acquisition cycle, not a heavier covenant.<\/p>\n<p>Two things would change that answer: a materially weaker PPA counterparty than you assumed, which pushes you toward lower leverage or a merchant structure, and a change in support schemes or tax treatment in your jurisdiction, which can remove a financing option entirely. Verify current tariffs, support schemes and lender terms for your market in 2026\u20132027 before committing capital; the structures described here are mechanisms, not offers, and nothing in this article is investment, tax or legal advice.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Solar Project Financing Models differ in one thing above all: which entity owns the plant and which entity&#8217;s cash flow repays the debt.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":6013,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"rank_math_internal_links_processed":["1"],"_thumbnail_id":["6013"],"rank_math_canonical_url":["https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/solar-project-financing-models\/"],"rank_math_title":["Solar Project Financing Models: Five Structures Compared"],"rank_math_description":["Solar Project Financing Models differ in one thing above all: which entity owns the plant and which entity's cash flow repays the debt."],"rank_math_focus_keyword":["Solar Project Financing Models"],"rank_math_primary_category":["28"],"_cmplz_scanned_post":["1"],"_elementor_page_assets":["a:0:{}"]},"categories":[28],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6014","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-financial-and-legal-content"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6014","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/9"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6014"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6014\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6013"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6014"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6014"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/solarplusgarden.com\/de\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6014"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}